New Technology Could Protect Against Parts Counterfeiting

Several years ago, the FAA estimated that unapproved parts played a role in 174 U.S. aircraft crashes or less serious accidents between May 1973 and April 1996, causing 17 deaths and 39 injuries, although none involved a major airline. Every year, with the help of the industry, FAA finds "suspected unapproved parts" in the supply chain. While the number of unapproved parts flagged by FAA’s unapproved parts program is fairly small, how many counterfeit parts escape notice? How much damage do they cause? Because crashes frequently destroy the parts that fail, it’s hard to know.

We haven’t heard much about the counterfeit parts problem since 1995, when then-FAA Inspector General Mary Schiavo sounded the alarm and triggered Congressional hearings. Speculating about the threat of bogus parts isn’t a favorite talking point for manufacturers, airlines or the FAA.

We do know that counterfeit parts makers are getting more sophisticated. For instance, in 2007, FAA issued an "unapproved parts notification" regarding counterfeit tail rotor hanger bearings electro-etched with fake Bell Helicopter part numbers.

So what more can the industry do about it? Benjamin Jun, VP for technology at Cryptography Research, is suggesting a high-tech solution the company first developed to prevent counterfeiting of consumer products: embedding tiny, 1-millimeter square, tamper-resistant silicone chips that signal their authenticity into key parts, particularly in the avionics systems in aircraft. The San Francisco-based firm designs the core of these "CryptoFirewall" chips to withstand sophisticated attacks by professional counterfeiters.

Here’s how the system would work: Mechanics would be given hand-held verifiers that could communicate with the embedded chip, which would respond, confirming who manufactured it and that it was FAA certified. The verifier would communicate an unpredictable challenge to the chip and verify the authenticity of the chip’s response. In some ways, the system resembles complex systems to defeat hackers.

The chip might also signal other information, like when it was manufactured, when it was installed or how many times it has been used, so that it could flag when it needed to be replaced, the way cars remind drivers when they need service.

Cryptography Research has already marketed its CryptoFirewall embedded-chip technology to protect several consumer products from counterfeiting. For instance, a chip in satellite TV systems verifies that the customer is authorized to use the signal. Chips in lithium batteries verify that they are appropriate for the cell phone they power. Another chip prevents counterfeiters from cloning the cell phones themselves. And chips in smart cards verify the identity of parties making large financial transactions.

What would such a system cost for aircraft parts? The cost depends on part volume. For high volume parts, like the ones used in consumer products, the added cost can be as low as 20 cents per part, according to Jun. For aircraft parts, which are manufactured in lower volumes, he projects that the cost would probably be more like a dollar or two per part. For components that already contain application-specific integrated circuits (ASICS), manufacturers could add CryptoFirewall logic to those circuits, which would be cheaper than installing stand-alone chips.

Since the technology has proven worthwhile to protect against counterfeit consumer products, where potential counterfeiting damages may be only a few hundred dollars per unit, Jun expects it would be cost-effective to authenticate aircraft parts whose failure can cause crashes and lead to fatalities.

Some aircraft manufacturers already incorporate radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) in aircraft parts. Although RFIDs can contain the same kind of information that could be included in CryptoFirewall chips, Jun says that counterfeiters have been able to copy RFIDs, as well as bar codes, holograms, and other passive security mechanisms. However, for non-security applications, Jun expects these technologies to remain popular since they can cost only a few cents per part.

Cryptography Research is just starting to explore the potential of the avionics market. Jun says that his firm hasn’t talked to the FAA yet. The company has not announced any deals with aircraft manufacturers, but then, it doesn’t usually disclose its customer base, giving an extra level of protection against potential counterfeiters.

According to Jun, it would probably take two to three years for a manufacturer to implement this embedded chip anti-counterfeiting technology.

Aircraft manufacturers could develop their own anti-counterfeiting computer chip systems without using Cryptography Research’s services and technology. But Jun cites several advantages of contracting out this specialized function, including Cryptography Research’s track record of security, bundled licenses for semiconductor security key patents, and faster time-to-market.